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This article aims to assess the impact that the European Convention of 
Human Rights, incorporated into British law through the Human Rights Act 
1998, has had on the control order regime in the United Kingdom. It will 
discuss recent British jurisprudence on the topical question of whether there 
can be a true balance between the civil liberties of an individual and the 
need to protect state and society from a continuing terrorist threat. The 
article compares the UK’s present control order system of summer 2010 
with similar legislation, which the Commonwealth jurisdictions of Australia 
and Canada have enacted to protect their nations from the threat of 
terrorism. It will conclude with a discussion of possible reforms as well as 
other security measures which have been identified as alternatives to 
control orders and which form the basis of present UK governmental 
initiatives to limit the scope and impact of anti terrorism legislation. 
I INTRODUCTION  
No free man shall be taken, or imprisoned, or dispossessed, or outlawed, or 
exiled, or in any way destroyed nor will we go upon him, nor will we send 
against him except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the 
land.1 
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1
 Magna Carta 1215 (UK) [39] and 1297 (UK) [29]. The Charter of 1215 was one of the first 
legal instruments that stated the superiority of the ordinary law over the arbitrary justice, 
which was asserted by King John of England throughout his reign from 1199 to 1216. Clause 
39 (29 of the 1297 version) was thought to have been demanded as the King had increasingly 
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The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in 
accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from 
terrorism but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what 
terrorism may achieve.2 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States3 and the 
bombings of 7 July 2005 in London4 led to the enactment of anti-terrorism 
legislation in the United Kingdom (UK) and many other states as a direct 
consequence. The threat of terrorism is not new to the UK: last century’s Irish 
Republican Army’s resort to terrorism serves as an early example of the use 
of asymmetric warfare5 as a means of achieving political goals. However, the 
present international terrorism threat to the UK (and its strategic allies) has 
changed in its scope, nature and modus operandi:6 today’s new challenge is 
the appearance of European ‘home-grown’ terrorism.7 The foiled Heathrow 
bomb plot of 2006 and the 2009 terrorist plot of the so called ‘Bradford Easter 
bombers’ to attack UK shopping centres serve as a grim reminder of this 
continuing threat to a democratic and pluralistic society.8 
                                                                                                                    
enforced his will by military means rather than civilian processes. The 1297 version can be 
accessed at < http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/Home.aspx>   
2
 Lord Hoffmann in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department; X v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 December 2004) [97]. 
3 Referring to the attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon by Arab terrorists of the 
Al-Qaeda network, which took place on 11 September 2001, in which some 3000 people lost 
their lives. See Dominic McGoldrick, From ‘9-11’ to the ‘Iraq War 2003’: International Law 
in an Age of Complexity (Hart Publishing, 2004) 9-11. See also National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report (2004). 
4
 See Home Office, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, 
House of Commons Paper No 1087, Session 2005-06 (2006) which recounts how 56 people 
died when four suicide bombers detonated explosive devices at different locations in London. 
Three of the bombers were born in the United Kingdom, but all four were inspired by Al-
Qaeda.  
5
 Home Office, Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for 
Countering International Terrorism, Cm 7833 (2010) 22. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 See Clive Walker, ‘Know Thine Enemy as Thyself: Discerning Friend from Foe under Anti-
Terrorism laws’ (2008) 32(1) Melbourne University Law Review 275 which states that recent 
terrorist attacks have come from individuals who are either second generation British citizens 
or individuals who have resided in the UK for most of their lives. Hence the term ‘neighbour’ 
terrorist used by Walker in his article which underlines the difference between these terrorists 
and the IRA terrorists of the ‘troubles’. 
8See Haroon Siddique, Bomb Plot Targeted Seven Heathrow Flights, Court Told (3 April 2008) 
Guardian.co.uk <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/apr/03/plane.plot> and Duncan 
Gardham, Al-Qaeda Terror Plot to Bomb Easter Shoppers (9 April 2009) Telegraph.co.uk 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/5133535/Al-Qaeda-terror-plot-to-
bomb-Easter-shoppers.html>: ‘An al-Qaeda cell was days away from carrying out an “Easter 
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Since 2000, the UK has enacted five major pieces of Anti-Terrorism 
Legislation (ATL)9: the Terrorism Act 2000; the Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001; the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; the Terrorism Act 
2006 and more recently the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. As could be 
expected, these anti-terrorism laws have been fiercely and extensively 
debated,10 the debate focusing on an apparent conflict arising from the need to 
protect human rights while fighting terrorism at the same time,11 as 
highlighted by Lord Hoffmann in his above cited pronouncement.  
For the British public the legislation also puts to the test an 800 year old core 
principle of the common law on personal liberty, as established under the 
Magna Carta of 1215. One of the more controversial aspects of ATL was the 
introduction of control orders12 under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
(PTA). Control orders are designed to restrict or prevent an individual’s 
suspicious activities with a view to countering the threat of terrorism in 
general.13 The rationale and the very nature of such orders — which are 
mostly intended to be pre-emptive or preventative of terrorist crime — often 
raise the question of their overall compatibility with human rights and civil 
liberties in general14 and with article 5 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) in particular.15 The new Tory-Liberal government criticised 
former Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s anti-terrorism legislation on many 
                                                                                                                    
spectacular” of co-ordinated suicide bomb attacks on shopping centres in Manchester, police 
believe’. 
9
 The term ATL refers to all types of legislation passed with the aim of fighting terrorism, and 
reflects the historically changing nature and ‘landscape’ of terrorism.  
10
 Clive Walker, ‘Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom’ (2006) 4(5), Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 1144. 
11
 Adam Sandell, ‘Liberty, Fairness and the UK Control Order Cases: Two Steps Forward, Two 
Steps Back’ (2008) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 120. 
12
 See Steve Foster, ‘Control Orders, Human Rights and the House of Lords’ (2007) 12(2) 
Coventry Law Journal 21.  
13
 Explanatory Notes, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) [4]. 
14
 Debate has also centred on? the compatibility of control orders with art 6 of the ECHR, the 
judicial process under which a control order is confirmed and also the right to disclosure of 
evidence. See Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46 and 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 28. 
15
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 
1953). Article 5(1) of the ECHR stipulates that everyone has the right to liberty and security 
of the person. No one shall be deprived of their liberty except in the circumstances listed from 
(a) to (e) in paragraph 1.   
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occasions before coming to power.16 It remains to be seen whether some of 
the stricter ATL measures will now be abolished or at least amended.  
In the light of such a prospect, it is time to take stock of the present (2010) 
ATL. This article will provide a reflective analysis of judicial challenges to 
the control order regime in the UK by assessing their compatibility with 
article 5 of the ECHR. It will compare the UK position with the situation in 
Australia and Canada. Finally, other possible and workable alternatives 
(including reforms) to the system of control orders will be examined. This 
article is aimed at the interested Australian reader who might have taken an 
interest in the Australian debate about the establishment of an independent 
reviewer of terrorism laws in Australia and who would like to learn more 
about the UK situation as a comparison. 
II CONTROL ORDERS UNDER UK ANTI-TERRORISM 
LEGISLATION  
A UK Anti-Terrorism Legislation post 2000 
The first comprehensive piece of anti-terrorism legislation passed in the UK 
was the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000). The TA 2000 consolidated and 
reformed previous ATL17 by formulating a comprehensive set of codes to 
replace the hastily drafted and fragmented laws that were seen in the UK prior 
to the TA 2000’s implementation.18 Next, and as a response to the attacks of 
11 September 2001, and to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
136819, the UK government passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001 (ATCSA). A major difference between it and the TA 2000 was the 
inclusion of a derogation clause which covered cases of non-compliance with 
                                                 
16
 See, eg, BBC News, New Terror Law Comes into Force (13 April 2006) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4905304.stm>; BBC News, Review All Anti-
Terrorism Laws, Say MPs (25 March 2010) <http://news.bbc.co. uk/1/hi/uk_politics/ 
8583643.stm>; Number10.gov.uk, Queen’s Speech - Freedom (Great Repeal) Bill (25 May 
2010) <http://www.number10.gov.uk/queens-speech/2010/05/queens-speech-freedom-great-
repeal-bill-50647>.   
17
 B Brandon, ‘Terrorism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: 120 Years of the UK’s Legal 
Response to Terrorism’ (2004) Dec Criminal Law Review 981. 
18
 Clive Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Oxford University 
Press, 2nd ed, 2009) 23. 
19
 SC Res 1368 UN SCOR, 56th sess, 4370 mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1368 (12 September 2001) 
which urged the international community to redouble its efforts to prevent and suppress 
terrorist acts. 
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article 5 of the ECHR.20 The derogation was made under article 15 of the 
ECHR (section 14 of the UK Human Rights Act, which implements the 
ECHR) which allows all Member States to derogate from their obligations 
under the Convention in times of public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation. The ATCSA was a legislative reflection of the findings of the 
European Court of Justice in Chahal v United Kingdom (1996).21 There the 
UK was informed of the possible implications of the deportation of a terrorist 
suspect to a state where torture was a possibility, namely that the deportation 
might constitute a contravention of the strict torture prohibition of article 3 of 
the ECHR.  
Part 4 of the ATCSA allows for the detention of terrorist suspects as well as 
for the deportation of foreign nationals, its powers thus falling within the 
wider ambit of immigration asylum police powers.22 These powers have 
hardly been used, with only a total of sixteen detention orders having been 
issued.23 Part 4 has been widely criticised as allowing a de facto detention 
without trial and the legality of the human rights derogation has been 
questioned in the light of article 15 of the ECHR (section 14 HRA): a 
damning report in 200324 by a review committee of Privy Counsellors, chaired 
by Lord Newton, found that Part 4 was not a ‘sustainable way of addressing 
the problem of terrorist suspects in the United Kingdom’,25 and called for its 
urgent repeal.26 This call was, however, dismissed by the Home Office27 and 
consequently led to no executive repeal.  
                                                 
20
 See Steve Foster, ‘The Fight against Terrorism, Detention without Trial and Human Rights’ 
(2009) 14(1) Coventry Law Journal 4. Section 1(2) Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42 also 
allows the government to avoid giving effect to the Convention to the extent that it has lodged 
a derogation within the meaning of s 14 of the Human Rights Act 1998.  
21
 Chahal v United Kingdom [1996] 23 EHRR 413.  
22
 The ATCSA did not allow for the possibility of deportation, reflecting on the earlier ECHR 
decision in Chahal. It only allowed for the detention of foreign nationals. Foreign nationals 
were previously deported under separate immigration powers (Immigration Act 1971). See 
Walker, above n 18, 213. 
23
 BBC News, UK Urged to Review Terrorism Laws (27 November 2004) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4047207.stm>. There seems to be some ambiguity with this 
number. Walker, above n 18, 213 states the number as seventeen. However Sangeeta Shah, 
‘The UK’s Anti-Terror Legislation and the House of Lords: The First Skirmish’ (2005) 5(2) 
Human Rights Law Review 403, 406 states that only 16 individuals were actually detained 
under the ATCSA, with one certified individual detained following a conviction for 
fraudulent activities. 
24
 The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK) c 24, s 122, allowed the Secretary of 
State to appoint a committee to review the Act. 
25
 Privy Counsellor Review Committee, Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Review: 
Report, House of Commons Paper No 100, Session 2003-04, 2003, 5. 
26
 Ibid. 
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The House of Lords judgment in A v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (A)28 forced the government to withdraw an earlier derogation 
clause in order to avoid a possible violation of articles 5 and 14 of the 
ECHR.29 The House of Lords held (Lord Hoffmann dissenting) that, in the 
circumstances of that case, an ‘emergency threatening the life of the nation’30 
existed sufficiently to warrant a derogation notice under article 15. It 
consequently dismissed the appellants’ first grounds of appeal.31 However, the 
Lords concluded that the measures implemented under Part 4 of the ATCSA 
(essentially detention without trial) were not proportionate, and therefore not 
‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’.32 Their Lordships also 
upheld the appellant’s argument that the section 23 provisions were 
discriminatory and therefore incompatible with article 14 of the ECHR, which 
provides that Convention rights should be enjoyed without discrimination.33 
The Lords stated that the statutory provisions allowed for foreign nationals — 
unlike UK nationals — to be deprived of their liberty,34 this amounting to 
discrimination based on the appellants’ nationality and immigration status.  
Any potential for derogation from the HRA/ECHR under the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 came to an end when section 
23 of the ATCSA was repealed35 as being incompatible with articles 5 and 14 
[have we been told the content of art 14?] of the ECHR as found in A, and was 
replaced with the new regime of control orders under the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005.  
                                                                                                                    
27
 See Home Office, Counter-Terrorism Powers, Cm 6147 (2004) which details the 
government’s response to the findings of the Privy Counsellor Review Committee on Part 4 
and gives its reasons on why the government thought the ATCSA was sufficient at the time. 
28
 (n 2) [96]. 
29
 Ibid [47]. The UK did not actually derogate from art 14; it only derogated from art 5, and the 
appellants had raised an argument for a possible infringement of their art 14 right. 
30
 As required under art 15 ECHR and Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42.  
31
 Home Office, above n 27, [29].  
32
 Ibid 35. 
33
 Ibid 73. 
34
 Ibid 138. 
35
 Parliament of United Kingdom, Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 
2001, 3644, 11 November 2010. The derogation order allowed the government to derogate 
from art 5 of the ECHR, thus allowing Part 4 of the ATCSA to be compliant with the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42.  
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B Control Orders as the New Tool for Fighting 
Terrorism 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA) came into force on 11 March 
2005, immediately causing intense criticism and debate between government 
and opposition parties,36 as well as in the House of Lords.37 The PTA was 
passed primarily to replace Part 4 of the ATCSA with the aim of allowing the 
executive to maintain further ‘control’ of individuals suspected of terrorism. 
Under the PTA a control order is ‘an order against an individual that imposes 
obligations on him for purposes connected with protecting members of the 
public from a risk of terrorism’,38 protection that is deemed ‘necessary for 
purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that 
individual in terrorism-related activity’.39 The scope of these restrictions for 
the controlee is quite wide40 and the restrictions can be used in combination 
with each other, with many controlees having multiple restrictions placed 
upon them.41  
The PTA allows essentially for two types of control order, namely derogating 
and non-derogating orders. A derogating control order is one that imposes 
obligations on the controlee which are ‘so draconian in their intrusion into 
liberty’42 that they can be justified only by means of explicit reference to a 
derogation notice43 under article 15 of the ECHR. Derogating control orders 
are usually applied for when ‘house arrest’ is sought. Consequently, such 
orders can only be issued by a court on application by the Home Secretary 
under section 4 of the PTA.44 Derogating orders last for six months,45 and are 
                                                 
36
 Walker, above n 18, 214.  
37
 Ibid. It did not help the discussion that the PTA became law just seventeen days after it had 
been brought before Parliament as a bill. 
38
 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) c 2, s 1(1).  
39
 Ibid 1(3).  
40
 These include the following restrictions: s 1(4)(d) – a restriction on association and 
communication with specified persons or with other persons generally; s 1(4)(f) - a 
prohibition on the controlee being at specified places or within a specified area at specific 
times or specific days; s 1(4)(j) - a requirement that the controlee give access to specific 
persons to their place of residence, and; s 1(4)(k) – a requirement that the persons be allowed 
to search the premises in order to ascertain whether obligations under the order are about to be 
contravened.  
41
 Lord Carlile, Fourth Report of the Independent Reviewer pursuant to Section 14(3) of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (3 February 2009) (Home Office, London, 2009), Annex 1.  
42
 Walker, above n 18, 222. 
43
 The issuance of non-derogating orders must be affirmed by a notice of derogation under art 
15, and a designation order under s 14(1)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42.   
44
 Under s 4(1)(a) of the PTA the court must hold an immediate preliminary hearing on an 
application from the Secretary of State to decide whether to make a derogating control order 
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renewable if the derogation notice remains in force.46 Considering these legal 
implications, it does not surprise that the government to date has not applied 
for derogating control orders.47 
The alternative is the issuance of a so called ‘non-derogating’ control order, 
which is issued by the Home Secretary with the confirmation of a court under 
sections 2 and 3 of the PTA. A non-derogating order must not, however, 
deprive a controlee of liberty pursuant to the terms of article 5 of the ECHR,48 
thus excluding any such measures as permanent detention at a single address. 
Under section 2(1) of the PTA, the Home Secretary can make a non-
derogating control order if he or she has ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity’;49 or 
he or she ‘considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with 
protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, to make a control 
order imposing obligations on that individual’.50 Non-derogating control 
orders expire after twelve months, with the option of renewal by the Home 
Secretary under section 2(4) of the PTA. In case of a renewal of the order, 
there is no automatic referral to a full judicial review, but the individual 
concerned can apply to the court for a further judicial review.51 On renewal of 
the order under section 2(6), the Home Secretary has to state that the order 
would protect the public from the risk of terrorism, and must justify the 
obligations imposed by the renewed order. However, there is no mandatory 
review requirement that evidence be adduced that the individual has actually 
been involved in any terrorism-related activity.  
III JUDICIAL CHALLENGES TO THE CONTROL ORDER 
REGIME IN THE CONTEXT OF POSSIBLE INFRINGEMENTS 
OF ARTICLE 5 ECHR 
Control orders are intrusive in their nature and possibly traumatic for the 
person affected. In a democracy they should be used only as an ultimo ratio of 
                                                                                                                    
against an individual. No time limit is, however, mentioned in the Act and the word 
‘immediate’ is not defined within it.  
45
 Ibid 4(8).  
46
 Under s 6 of the PTA the Home Secretary has the power, if necessary, to impose derogating 
obligations under the original derogation. 
47
 Carlile, above n 41, 15. 
48
 Ibid s 1(2)(a).  
49
 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) c 2, s 2(1)(a).  
50
 Ibid s 2(1)(b).  
51
 Explanatory Notes, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) [11].  
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any anti-terror policing. The UK Joint Committee on Human Rights52 
considers the control order regime per se as constituting a violation of the 
fundamental human right to liberty under article 5 ECHR.53 A certain 
reluctance to use control orders seems to corroborate this. Since 2005 a total 
of only 45 individuals have been subjected to them54 and since 10 December 
2009 only 12 individuals have been subjected to control orders — three fewer 
than the previous year.55  
Two decisions by the House of Lords in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v JJ56 and Secretary of State for the Home Department v E57 are 
particularly relevant when questioning the compatibility of control orders with 
article 5 ECHR. 
A The Case of JJ and Article 5 of the ECHR 
In JJ the six respondents were subject to an 18 hour curfew in designated one 
bedroom flats which were located in an area deliberately unfamiliar to them.58 
The appellants were ordered to wear electronic tags and were confined to 
movements within 72 square kilometres beyond their residence, not including 
any area which they had previously lived.59 The controlees were not allowed 
to meet any unauthorised persons and their premises could be searched at any 
time.60 The House of Lords held, by a three to two majority (Lord Hoffmann 
and Lord Caswell dissenting), that the obligations imposed by the control 
orders deprived the respondents of their liberty and therefore breached article 
5. Lord Bingham concluded that the controlees lives ‘were wholly regulated 
by the Home Office, as a prisoner’s would be’,61 consequently concurring 
                                                 
52
 The UK Joint Committee on Human Rights is a parliamentary select committee which 
undertakes thematic inquiries on human rights issues and reports its findings and 
recommendations to the House. It has become increasingly involved with human rights 
questions arising from the ECHR. 
53
 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights 
(Fourteenth Report): Annual Renewal of Control Order Legislation 2009, House of Lords 
Paper No 37, House of Commons Paper No 282, Sessions 2008-09 (2009) [9].  
54
 Carlile, above n 41, 17.  
55
 Ibid.  
56
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45 (31 October 2007). 
57
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v E [2007] 1 AC 499 (HL). 
58
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2006] EWCA 1141 (Civ) (1 August 2006) 
[20].  
59
 Ibid.  
60
 See Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2006] EWHC 1623 (Admin) (28 June 
2006), where Sullivan J sets out in Annex 1 of his judgment the full obligations imposed by 
the control orders. 
61
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45 (31 October 2007) [24].  
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with the prior judgement of Sullivan J that the restrictions were ‘the antithesis 
of liberty and equivalent to imprisonment’.62  
The scope of the right to liberty under article 5 of the ECHR63 was outlined by 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Guzzardi v Italy.64 The right 
is not concerned with mere restrictions on liberty of movement... In order to 
determine whether someone has been ‘deprived of his liberty’ within the 
meaning of Article 5 (art. 5), the starting point must be his concrete 
situation and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the 
type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in 
question.65  
In the earlier High Court hearing of JJ, Sullivan J relied on Guzzardi when 
stating that the obligations imposed by the orders were so severe that they 
amounted to a deprivation of liberty, contrary to article 5 of the ECHR. They 
amounted to more than a mere restriction of the right to freedom of 
movement,66 a right protected under article 2 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR, 
which the UK has not ratified yet.67  
Lord Bingham pointed out in his judgment that there was ‘no bright line’ 
between liberty and restriction.68 The scope of Guzzardi is open to 
interpretation:69 Lord Hoffmann took the view that a controlee had to be 
actually imprisoned, or in circumstances which came very close to an actual 
imprisonment, for there to be a deprivation of liberty.70 Nevertheless, the 
majority of the Lords (with Lord Hoffmann and Lord Carswell dissenting) 
held that the general social isolation imposed on the controlees was, in effect, 
                                                 
62
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2006] EWCA 1141 (Civ) (1 August 2006) 
[74]. 
63
 The Courts also took into account the decision in Mancini v Italy (European Court of Human 
Rights, Chamber, Application No 44955/98, 2 August 2001) where it was held that house 
arrest for 24 hours a day constitutes a deprivation of liberty.  
64
 Guzzardi v Italy (1980) 39 Eur Court HR (ser A). The case concerned a suspected mafia 
member who had been exiled to a 2½ square? kilometre part of a small island off Sardinia. He 
was also subjected to a 9 hour curfew. 
65
 Ibid [92].  
66
 The Court of Appeal subsequently concurred with Sullivan J and upheld his findings in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2006] EWCA 1141 (Civ) (1 August 2006).  
67
 See Ed Bates, ‘Anti-terrorism Control Orders: Liberty and Security Still in the Balance’ 
(2009) 29(1) Legal Studies 102.  
68
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45 (31 October 2007) [17].  
69
 See Bates, above n 67, 103.  
70
 (n 68) [44]. Lord Hoffmann supported his statement by stating that the law would otherwise 
place too great a restriction on the powers of the state to deal with serious terrorist threats to 
the lives of its citizens. 
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‘solitary confinement’, due to the length of the curfew (18 hours) and the lack 
of opportunity to interact with the outside world.71 Lord Bingham stated that 
an analogy with detention in an open prison was apt, though the actual fate of 
the controlees was bleaker, since they could ‘not enjoy the association with 
others and the access to entertainment facilities which a prisoner in an open 
prison would expect to enjoy’.72 The control orders were therefore quashed by 
the Lords, as the Secretary of State had no power to make the orders as they 
were clearly incompatible with article 5 of the ECHR, and the defects of the 
orders could not be cured by amending specific obligations.73  
The case of JJ demonstrates how the Law Lords have seemingly taken a 
narrow approach to article 5. This was aptly shown in Lord Hoffmann’s 
summation of the case when he stated that the right of liberty could be 
breached only by ‘literal physical restraint’;74 otherwise there would be a 
danger that ‘the law would place too great a restriction on the powers of the 
state to deal with serious terrorist threats to the lives of its citizens’.75 Lord 
Hoffmann further observed that the liberty of an individual is ‘too precious to 
be sacrificed for any other reason than to safeguard the survival of the state’, 
which he felt was under threat from terrorism.76 Lord Brown, however, 
disagreed with this view and suggested that there was no general national 
emergency and that the right to liberty should be ‘absolute in its terms’.77 
Whether the country is in a general national emergency is certainly a moot 
point, as highlighted in the above case of A.78 
B Response to JJ by the Government in Relation to 
Curfew Periods 
The then Home Secretary sought to rectify the situation in which JJ had left 
the government by arguing that if control orders breached article 5, then the 
courts should not quash the orders, but only the offending obligations, or 
                                                 
71
 Ibid [24].  
72
 Ibid.  
73
 This finding is supported by the case A v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, 
Grand Chamber, Application No 3455/05, 19 February 2009) where the Strasbourg Court 
held that exceptions to art 5 required strict interpretation, which seems consistent with Lord 
Bingham’s approach. 
74
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45 (31 October 2007) [36].  
75
 Ibid [44]. 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 Ibid [107]. 
78
 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department; X v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 December 2004). 
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should direct modifications to them.79 However, as stated above, the Lords in 
JJ had taken the line that the derogation orders were effectively a nullity, and 
could not be cured, and new orders were required.80 JJ was subsequently 
taken by the government effectively to indicate that control orders with a 16 
hour curfew, together with the restrictions applicable in JJ, would not breach 
article 5.81  
Consequently, the UK government rejected the recommendation made by the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights that the maximum length of a curfew 
should not exceed 12 hours.82 The Home Office clearly does not view JJ as 
fundamentally undermining the viability of control orders, even though 
modified arrangements on restrictions entail greater expenditure on 
surveillance.83   
The notion that the maximum curfew length for control orders is 16 hours is 
derived from Lord Brown’s judgment in JJ.84 Lord Brown adopted the stance 
that 16 hour curfew periods would not amount to deprivation of liberty, as 
such a regime ‘restricts the suspect’s liberty of movement rather than actually 
deprives him of his liberty’.85 His Lordship stated that this should nevertheless 
be the ‘absolute limit’. Lord Brown expanded on his reasoning by stating that 
the European (Strasbourg) Court of Human Rights would surely conclude that 
a longer curfew regime than 16 hours a day would be a deprivation of 
liberty,86 and that it might conclude 16 hours to be too long. But this was for 
the Strasbourg Court to decide.87  
                                                 
79
 Walker, above n 18, 233.  
80
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The Joint Committee on Human Rights88 asserted in general that the topic of 
curfew periods would find its way to the Strasbourg Court in due course. It 
stated also that, in the meantime, Parliament should reach its own view about 
what the right to liberty under article 5 requires in relation to curfew periods, 
and should then define it in the statutory framework governing control 
orders.89  
Legal opinion seems to be divided on whether to confirm the view that a 16 
hour curfew does not constitute a de facto deprivation of liberty in terms of 
article 5 ECHR. See, for example, the case of Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v AE.90 The most recent case on this issue — Secretary of State 
for the Home Department v AP91 — has given the Supreme Court (formerly 
the House of Lords) a chance to establish whether a 16 hour curfew is 
contrary to article 5. At first instance the High Court had held that a 16 hour 
curfew can effect a deprivation of liberty when it is coupled with other 
restrictions, to the extent that it imposes a high degree of social isolation.92 
Keith J held that the restrictions were the ‘equivalent of internal exile’ which 
caused AP to be ‘socially isolated during the relatively few hours in the day 
when he is not under house arrest [and unable]to make even social 
arrangements because pre-arranged meetings ... are prohibited’.93 This led to 
Keith J concluding that the restrictions placed on AP were a deprivation of 
liberty rather than a restriction of movement.94 
The Court of Appeal95 reversed the decision of the High Court (Carnwath LJ 
dissenting) and held that Keith J was wrong in law to permit the issue of 
family visits to ‘tip the balance’ towards a breach of article 5 ECHR,96 as it 
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was not impossible for him to be visited by his family.97 The Supreme Court 
has, however, subsequently reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and 
held that the 16 hour curfew period along with the restrictions placed upon 
AP, did amount to a deprivation of liberty.98 Lord Brown concluded that the 
practical difficulties faced by the family in visiting AP should not have been 
ignored by the Court of Appeal and restored Keith J’s original judgment.99   
C The Case of E and the Possible Conflict with 
Article 5 
Similarly to JJ, the case of the Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
E100 focused on the question of whether control order curfew periods 
constitute a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of article 5. The suspect 
E was required to reside at a particular address and remain there for a 12 hour 
period between 7pm and 7am. E was prohibited from having unauthorised 
visitors to his apartment and any pre-arranged meetings elsewhere, and was 
prohibited from using a mobile phone or any equipment capable of connecting 
to the internet.101 
Initially, the High Court as the court of first instance had found that the 
cumulative effect of the curfew period, and the other obligations imposed by 
the control order, deprived E of his liberty, therefore breaching article 5 of the 
ECHR.102 The High Court followed the approach of the Court of Appeal 
decision in JJ, in looking at the cumulative effect of the restrictions set out in 
the control order.103  
                                                 
97
 Ibid [31]. Keith J in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP [2008] EWHC 2001 
(Admin) (12 August 2008) [88] stated that the family of AP could visit him on Sundays and 
other days of the week outside the school term, and use off peak travel times to get the 
advantage of lower fares. 
98
 AP v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA 731 (Civ) (15 July 2009) 
[15].  
99
 Ibid.  
100
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v E [2007] 1 AC 499 (HL). 
101
 See ibid [34]-[37] for a detailed list of all the obligations imposed on the suspect by the 
control order. 
102
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v E [2007] EWHC 233 (Admin) (16 February 
2007) [242]. The High Court also looked at other ECHR based arguments. Beatson J held that 
the Home Secretary was informed properly about E’s mental health and the health of his 
family as well as the impact of the obligations on them: [269]. Beatson J also concluded that 
the control order restrictions did not violate or risk violating E’s children’s rights under art 3 
of the ECHR: [309]. 
103
 Ibid [241].  
2010 CONTROL ORDERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 15 
The Court of Appeal, however, took a different view,104 with Pill LJ stating 
that the starting point for a consideration on whether article 5(1) had been 
breached was to consider the actual physical liberty of the person105 in terms 
of an individual liberty in the classic sense.106 The Lord Justices found a clear 
distinction between the facts of E and those of JJ and declared the cases to be 
very different in their facts.107 E was deprived only of the right to leave his 
home in the overnight hours (7pm to 7am) with no geographical restriction 
place upon him during the daytime.108 This led the Court of Appeal to hold 
that the degree of physical restraint upon the liberty of E, bearing in mind the 
‘type, duration, effects and manner of implementation’ of the order,109 was far 
from constituting a deprivation of his liberty under article 5.110 The House of 
Lords subsequently concurred with the Court of Appeal in its summation that 
there was no contravention of article 5(1).111 
D Some Concluding Observations on the 
Compatibility of Control Orders with Article 5 
In conclusion, the jurisprudence emanating from the courts shows that control 
order curfew periods and restrictions have to be assessed on a case by case 
basis to decide whether they contravene article 5. The cases of JJ and E 
clearly showed that previously courts considered curfew periods of 16 hours 
or less as a non deprivation of liberty within the meaning of article 5. 
However, with the recent Supreme Court ruling in AP, the courts have now 
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seemingly taken the stance that a 16 hour curfew coupled with other 
restrictions does in fact amount to a deprivation of liberty. It has yet to be seen 
whether the government will now impose curfew periods of no more than 16 
hours in order to comply with the decisions emanating from the Supreme 
Court. So far the government has resisted the continued pressure applied to it 
by the Joint Committee on Human Rights to have the maximum curfew length 
set at 12 hours, arguing that if it did this, it would significantly damage its 
ability to protect the public from the threat of terrorism.112 Some academic 
commentators seem to affirm this view, considering that, for the purpose of 
combating terrorism, significant limitations to fundamental civil liberties may 
have to take place within the scope of the ECHR.113 Others point out that case 
law implies the opposite: the case of E, considered in conjunction with JJ, 
indicates that the government’s policy of employing non-derogating control 
orders is proving ineffective in security terms.114  
The courts’ refusal to accept curfews which confine individuals to their homes 
for long periods of time, as seen in JJ and AP, as being compatible with 
article 5 of the ECHR, puts the government in a difficult situation. If the 
courts will allow only limited curfews, such as the one in E, there might be a 
possibility that controlees will abscond.115 Also, limited curfew periods will 
still allow determined suspects to proceed with possible terrorist-related 
activities, thus defeating the whole rationale behind the implementation of 
control orders. Doubtless, courts and government will continue to disagree 
over the difficult task of balancing the scope of protection granted by article 5 
and the need to safeguard the security of the nation. 
IV LOOKING ABROAD – CONTROL ORDERS IN AUSTRALIA 
AND CANADA  
Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 other Commonwealth 
countries have followed the example of the UK and introduced their own form 
of ‘control orders’ to their legislative systems. Australia and Canada are the 
main Commonwealth jurisdictions which have implemented legislation, 
which is designed to restrict or prevent an individual’s movements as a means 
of combating terrorism and which raises questions of human rights 
compatibility.  
                                                 
112
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A The Australian Control Order Regime 
1 Overview 
Post 9/11Australia implemented a range of anti-terrorism measures following 
the September 11 attacks on the United States.116 Although there has not been 
a terrorist attack on Australian soil itself, Australia nonetheless has been 
directly affected by terrorism.117 Australian citizens died in the September 11 
attacks and only a year later, on 12 October 2002, 88 Australian holiday 
makers were killed in the Bali bombings in Indonesia.118 In the absence of any 
substantial experience, either of a terrorist threat or of designing a legal 
framework to counter it, the Commonwealth of Australia has relied heavily on 
the anti-terrorism laws of the UK when constructing its own national security 
framework.119 On 27 September 2005, and as a response to the 7 July 
bombings in London, the Council of Australian Governments decided to 
strengthen anti-terrorism laws further by implementing [or passing?] the Anti-
Terrorism Act [No 2] 2005 (ATA) which amended the Criminal Code Act 
1995.120 Control orders, preventative detention orders121 and prohibited 
contact orders122 were all introduced into the Criminal Code Act through the 
ATA.  
Control orders under Division 104123 of the Criminal Code Act can last for 
periods of up to 12 months, similar to the UK control order system. The 
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issuance of a control order involves a senior Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
member making a written request to the Attorney-General.124 Once consent 
has been given,125 the senior AFP member must then put a request before a 
court.126 The court must then be satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, 
the order would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act, or that the 
individual has provided training to, or received training from, a listed terrorist 
organisation.127  
The Australian control order system therefore follows the example of the UK 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), concerned with individuals who are 
involved in ‘terrorism related activity’ which is defined in section 1 (9) of the 
PTA.128 Like the PTA, the amended Criminal Code Act contains in section 
104.5(3) an exhaustive list of restrictions and obligations under which a 
controlee can be placed.129  The court must, however, be satisfied on the 
balance of probabilities that each of the obligations, prohibitions and 
restrictions imposed is necessary and reasonably appropriate and adapted for 
the purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist attack. The statutory 
framework governing control orders in Australia is therefore very similar to 
that of the UK, with a few exceptions. 
One such exception is the fact that Australian control orders are issued by the 
federal courts rather than a member of the executive. In the UK the Secretary 
of State issues the control order, which is then confirmed by the court, and the 
judiciary has a role only in cases where control orders are challenged?? [We 
are not sure what the foregoing sentence means.]. It appears, therefore, that 
the Australian judiciary, in its active role in issuing control orders, is likely to 
ensure stronger protection of an individual controlee’s rights than would be 
the case in the UK. Some commentators see this strong role of the judiciary as 
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problematic, blurring the distinction between the roles of the executive and 
the judiciary. They criticise it for effectively watering down the concept of the 
separation of powers.130 
Another difference is the absence of an equivalent to section 8 of the PTA 
which provides for a legislative ‘check and balance’ to ensure that the 
Secretary of State’s decision to issue a control order has been undertaken with 
consideration of the viability of a criminal prosecution.131 The AFP 
Commissioner is statutorily obliged, under section 104.19(1) of the Criminal 
Code Act, to apply for revocation of a control order only when satisfied that 
the grounds for its issuance have ceased to exist — not when evidence 
becomes available that might support a prosecution.  
Another, significant, difference of the Australian control order regime is the 
absence of a mechanism for independent review of ATL in general. In the 
UK, under section 14(2) of the PTA, an independent reviewer of terrorism 
legislation must be appointed — currently Lord Carlile of Berriew.132 Despite 
the fact that Australia has an Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, 
his authority does not cover the activities of the AFP or the legislative 
framework which governs the Australian control order regime.133 The 
appointment of an independent reviewer of terrorist legislation, who would 
report annually to Parliament and have the ability to set his own agenda, had 
been recommended by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security.134 The latest bill, proposing an independent reviewer — the so called 
                                                 
130
 Lynch, above n 119, 183. Lynch suggests that the judiciary should be kept out of the process 
by which the orders are made, and therefore should be reserved for a more clearly defined role 
of reviewing executive decisions 
131
 The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) c 2, s 8(2) provides that before making or 
applying for a control order, the Secretary of State must consult the police to ascertain 
whether there is enough evidence available that could be realistically used for the purposes of 
prosecuting the individual for a terrorism related offence. Section 8(4) provides that the 
question of whether a criminal prosecution is viable is kept under review while the order 
persists and the police are to advise on the matter at meetings of the Control Order Review 
Group (CORG). See also Lynch, above n 119, 181. 
132
 Lord Carlile, Fifth Report of the Independent Reviewer pursuant to Section 14(3) of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (1 February 2010) Official Documents <http://www. 
official-documents.gov.uk/document/other/9781849871518/9781849871518.pdf>. Lord 
Carlile also visited Australia in June 2009 to give advice on the prospect of creating a similar 
monitoring role in Australia. 
133
 Bronwen Jaggers, ‘Anti-terrorism Control Orders in Australia and the United Kingdom: A 
Comparison’ (Research Paper No 28, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2008) 
11. Although complaints regarding the actions of the AFP may be made to the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, the Ombudsman may only review individual complaints, rather 
than the overall operation of the control order scheme. 
134
 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, 
Review of Security and Counter Terrorism Legislation (2006) 20. This call for an independent 
20 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 15 NO 2 
National Security Legislation Monitor — is being considered by the 
Australian government [parliament?] after some considerable debate.135 
Although the proposed monitor’s role is modelled on the UK’s Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Laws, earlier opinions suggested that the Australian 
model for an independent reviewer should differ from that of the UK by 
having a panel of reviewers rather than a single person, in order to draw on 
wider expertise.136 It has also been suggested that the reviewers should have 
explicit links to a Parliamentary committee in order to ensure that there is 
constant debate on the work of the reviewer.137  
2 Judicial Challenges to Control Orders in Australia 
Before turning to the judicial challenges in Australia, it is interesting from a 
Continental point of view to observe an overall failure by the Australian 
government to successfully communicate the necessity of control orders to the 
wider public.138 The former used the existence of the UK’s control order 
regime as reassurance to the Australian public that control orders were ‘not 
very extraordinary at all’, and that the orders came from the legitimate arsenal 
of anti-terrorism measures that any liberal and democratic government would 
use in responding to the threat of terrorist violence.139  
Australia is the only western democracy not having a written bill of rights, 
entrenched or otherwise, for the protection of civil and fundamental rights.140 
Instead, it prefers to rely on informal mechanisms such as a trust in the basic 
decency of the government, an independent judiciary, the transparency of 
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judicial and administrative processes, and trial by jury.141 Political and legal 
debate in Australia is also usually unconstrained by fundamental human rights 
principles and the rule of law.142 However, the push for an Australian bill of 
rights, influenced by the example of the British Human Rights Act 1998, came 
to an end in April 2010. In that month the Australian government rejected the 
recommendation of the National Human Rights Consultation Committee, 
chaired by Father Frank Brennan, that the Parliament ought to enact a 
statutory bill of rights like the HRA. Despite the fact that since 1980 Australia 
has been party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) as well as other major international human rights instruments143 it 
still has not enacted a domestic Human Rights Act.144 Australia has opted 
instead for the creation of a general Human Rights Framework which outlines 
a series of pre-legislative measures to protect and promote human rights.145 
Consequently, judicial challenges to control orders differ from UK cases by 
focussing on constitutional questions arising from the application of such 
measures.  
In August 2007, the High Court of Australia upheld the constitutional validity 
of the new control order regime in the case Thomas v Mowbray.146 The court 
held by a 5:2 majority (Kirby and Hayne JJ dissenting) that the validity of 
Division 104 was sufficiently supported by the defence power147 and did not 
breach Chapter Three of the Australian Constitution.148 The appellant, 
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Thomas, argued that Division 104 was invalid because it was not supported 
by one or more express or implied heads of legislative power under the 
Commonwealth Constitution.149 Gleeson CJ quickly dismissed this claim and 
held that the legislation governing control orders was an exercise of the 
defence power under section 51(iv) of the Australian Constitution as well as 
of the external affairs power under section 51(xxix).  
The High Court also rejected Thomas’ further argument that the powers 
invested in the judiciary were not judicial in nature and therefore could not 
constitutionally be conferred on a court by Commonwealth legislation.150 
Gleeson CJ’s reasoning for holding that Chapter Three of the Australian 
Constitution was not contravened151 included analogies with powers that 
historically had been exercised by courts in Australia or elsewhere, such as 
the power to grant bail and to make apprehended violence orders.152 The High 
Court also accepted that it was more opportune for a court to exercise such 
powers than for other institutions to do so.153 This was due to the courts 
offering better protection for human rights and to the fact that ‘to decide that 
such powers are exclusively within the province of the executive branch of 
government would be contrary to our legal history’.154  The dissenting opinion 
of Kirby J, however, argued that Division 104 was beyond the judicial power 
of the Commonwealth, with Kirby J stating that the control order regime was 
‘novel and offensive to principle’.155 
The decision in Thomas v Mowbray was silent on the question of whether the 
control order restrictions placed on the appellant violated his civil liberties or 
affected his right of liberty. It only challenged the constitutional doctrine in 
Australia about the role and independence of the federal judiciary.156 To date 
no civil liberty arguments have been raised before the federal courts in 
Australia, unlike the position in the UK where possible violations of civil 
liberties through ATL have been intensely debated. Thomas v Mowbray is to 
date the only significant case in Australia which has challenged the country’s 
control order regime. The only other control order to be issued in Australia 
was against David Hicks in December 2007 (confirmed in February 2008).157 
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Although there were no constitutional challenges to the control order regime 
in that case, the conditions of the order were slightly altered by Federal 
Magistrate Donald Warren,158 which could be perceived as a small victory to 
Mr Hicks in reducing the regularity of his reporting to the police.159  
With few control orders having been issued to date in Australia (compared 
with a total of 45 in the UK), mounting criticism of the regime and an 
apparent willingness by Australian security services to resort to monitoring 
and surveillance tactics instead, the question arose of whether control orders 
are strictly necessary in Australia at all. 
B Controlling Terror Suspects: The Canadian 
Approach 
1 Overview and Introduction to the Canadian Security 
Certificate regime  
Canada has taken a different approach from the UK in trying to ‘control’ 
terrorist suspects. The policy instrument of choice has been immigration 
legislation allowing for the deportation — by means of so-called Security 
Certificates — of non-citizens suspected of constituting a security threat to the 
country.160 Only two months after September 11 the Canadian government 
enacted the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), which received 
Royal Assent on 1 November 2001.161 The actual draft legislation pre-dated 
the 9/11 attacks on the United States, and the content of the Act itself did 
consequently not reflect on the attacks; its content just served to dampen 
previous political dissent.162 The Canadian government had already decided to 
take a robust approach to non-citizens; the events of September 11 simply 
made it easier to implement these measures and to communicate them to the 
broader public.163 
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The raison d’être for the use of a security certificate is to remove from 
Canada ‘non-Canadians who have no legal right to be [t]here and who pose a 
serious threat to Canada and Canadians’.164 Section 77 of the IRPA allows the 
issuance of a so-called security certificate, indicating that the presence of a 
permanent resident or foreign national is undesirable on grounds of (public) 
security, a possible violation of human or international rights, or allegations of 
involvement in? serious and organised criminality.165 After issuance of the 
certificate the named individual can then be indefinitely detained, pending 
reasonableness review of their case by the Federal Court, under section 78 of 
the IRPA.166  
Pursuant to section 82(2) of the IRPA, a review of the reasons for continued 
detention must be commenced, and, until a final determination is made 
concerning the reasonableness of the certificate, the individual must be 
brought before a judge at least once in the six month period following reach 
review.167 A judge can order continued detention only if he or she is satisfied 
that the detainee continues to be a threat either to national security or to the 
safety of others, or that the detainee is unlikely to appear for proceedings or 
removal.168 However these requirements are applicable only in cases of a 
permanent resident.169 If the subject is a foreign national with non-permanent 
residence status,170 the IPRA does not mandate any review of the detention 
prior to the determination of the security certificates reasonableness.171 
Therefore the decision to issue such a certificate does also serve as a decision 
on the legality of a subsequent removal order which cannot be appealed 
against.172 Once the Security Certificate has been upheld as ‘reasonable’ by 
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the Federal Court, the named individual is deportable with no further 
opportunity to appeal. Section 80 of the IRPA implies that the security 
certificate which has been determined as reasonable by the courts ‘serves’ as a 
removal order. The IPRA does not place a statutory limit on the length of 
detention, except that it allows the person named on the certificate to apply for 
release at any time, for the purpose of permitting departure from Canada, 
under section 82.4 of the Act. 
These measures are very similar to Part 4 of the UK’s Anti-terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001, which authorised the detention without trial of foreign 
nationals. The UK could not originally deport foreign nationals, however 
deliberately, in cases where a possible violation of the ECHR would be the 
consequence. The European Court of Human Rights had held in Chahal v 
UK,173 that an individual could not be returned to his country of origin if faced 
with the possibility of torture or any other treatment contrary to article 3 of the 
ECHR. This position has changed with the introduction of control orders 
together with so called Deportation with Assurances (DWAs) measures, 
whereby the Government obtains assurances from other countries which 
ensure that individuals can be deported there without a risk of their human 
rights being breached.174  
Section 82.4 of the Canadian IPRA effectively detains foreign nationals 
suspected of terrorism offences indefinitely, unless they decide to return to 
their own or another country. This consequence reminds us of the stark 
warning of Nicholls J in his seminal decision in the UK case A v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department,175 where he describes section 23 of the 
ATCSA as effectively creating a prison which only ‘has three walls’ due to 
the certified individuals being allowed release only if they are willing to face 
the ‘prospect of ill treatment in any country willing to admit them’.176 The 
constitutionality and reasonableness of the possibility of such indefinite 
detention under the IRPA was subsequently challenged in Charkaoui v 
Canada.177 There the Supreme Court of Canada held that the absence of any 
detention review for foreign nationals until after the security certificate was 
reviewed by the Federal Court constituted a violation of the constitutional 
right against arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter of Rights and 
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Freedoms.178 In October 2007, the Canadian government responded to the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Charkaoui by introducing Bill C-3, which 
amended the IPRA by adding provisions relating to special advocates. 
However the Bill made no reference to the legality of deporting non-citizens 
to countries where they face the possibility of torture. The Bill did, however, 
extend the requirement of a detention review to foreign nationals as well as 
permanent residents.179  
2 Deportation and the Threat of Torture: Challenges to 
the Canadian Security Certificate Regime  
The possibility of foreign nationals subjected to deportation under the IRPA 
facing torture and other maltreatment in their countries of origin raises legal 
questions regarding the possibility of a contravention of article 3 of the UN 
Convention against Torture,180 as well as the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.181 The two cases of Suresh v Canada182 and Ahani v 
Canada,183concerned individuals affected by security certificates and whose 
possible expulsion from Canada would put them at a substantial risk of torture 
by their respective governments. They argued that their expulsion would 
breach article 3 of the UN Convention against Torture.184 
In Suresh, it was alleged that the appellant was a member of and fundraiser 
for a proscribed terrorist organisation185 and consequently a security 
certificate was issued, with the appellant therefore facing the prospect of 
deportation.186 The Supreme Court of Canada held that, while it did not 
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exclude the possibility that in ‘exceptional circumstances’ deportation to face 
torture might be justified under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms,187 it is generally held that foreign nationals should not be 
deported when there is a substantial risk of torture.188 The Court stated that it 
was not directly constrained by article 3 of the UN Convention, but the 
‘fundamental justice balance under section 7 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms generally precludes deportation to torture when applied on a case 
by case basis’.189 The Supreme Court reaffirmed this view in its decision in 
the case of Ahani, and held that the findings in Suresh in respect to the 
prohibition to deport in cases of the possibility of torture should be 
followed.190  Despite this confirmation, the court dismissed the case of Ahani 
on the grounds that Ahani did not face a substantial and realistic risk of torture 
in Iran due his personal affiliation to the regime in Tehran.191 
This decision in Ahani seems to overlook the fact that Canada is party to the 
UN Torture Convention, and also appears to contradict the continental view 
and position of the UK as highlighted by the ECtHR in the case of Chahal v 
UK discussed above. Despite its regional character, the ECHR does indeed 
reiterate the binding international character of the prohibition of the use of 
torture as a jus cogens prohibition of international law. It seems that the 
Canadian government is aware of its legally doubtful position as evidenced by 
it having chosen to invoke ‘exceptional circumstances’ in each security 
certificate case where the opportunity has arisen192 in order to justify a 
possible derogation from its state obligations under international law.  
The current measures taken by Canada in her attempt to prevent foreign 
nationals from becoming a terrorist threat to the nation are, as demonstrated, 
more radical, or even draconian, than those adopted by the UK and Australia. 
The UK has addressed the threat of future terrorist attacks through the 
enactment of control orders and assurance arrangements (DWAs) with several 
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countries. Undoubtedly, the Canadian security certificate regime would not be 
acceptable in the UK, which has moved away from the previous detention 
without trial regime, implemented under the ATCSA. The UK’s new control 
order regime appears certainly preferable to the security certificate system of 
Canada thanks to its apparent compliance with international human rights law.  
V THE FUTURE OF CONTROL ORDERS: PROPOSED 
REFORMS AND ALTERNATIVE MEASURES 
Control orders have now been in existence for five years and seem set to 
remain in force for the foreseeable future, despite the legal challenges and 
media scrutiny. The UK’s new coalition government, which came into power 
on 12 May 2010, has ordered a review of the current control order regime, a 
review which formed part of their manifesto pledge to the electorate.193 Prior 
to the 2010 election the Liberal Democrats wanted control orders to be 
completely scrapped whereas the Conservatives only wanted a review, and 
have consistently abstained from voting against control orders in 
Parliament.194 Nevertheless, senior representatives from both parties have 
called control orders ‘illiberal’,195 ‘inherently objectionable’ and ‘ill-
conceived’.196 Against this background of earlier dissent, we will now briefly 
reflect on proposed reforms for control orders and/or alternative measures that 
could be implemented. 
The future of control orders and proposed reforms must be informed by the 
current high national security threat that terrorism continues to pose to the 
UK, a situation which is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. Indeed 
it may even be fuelled by the ongoing military engagements arising out of 
what was once labelled the ‘war on terror’ by the United States of America 
and its allies. The British government’s official response to this threat is 
centred on ‘prevention’197 which is reflected in its ‘counter strategy to the 
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threat of terrorism’ or ‘CONTEST’. The aim of the strategy – ‘Pursue, 
Prevent, Protect, Prepare’198 - is ‘to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests 
overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives 
freely and with confidence’.199  
A An Alternative Approach I: Travel Restriction Orders   
Lord Carlile, in his latest report on control orders,200 has suggested the 
possibility of Travel Restriction Orders (TROs) as a substitute and 
replacement for ‘light touch’ control orders, which are those considered to 
place lesser restrictions upon the individual.201 The main purpose of the TROs 
would be to restrain an individual, who appears not to have participated in any 
other terrorist acts or planning, from leaving the United Kingdom to train as a 
terrorist or otherwise participate in terrorist attacks outside the UK.202 The 
TROs would be intended for individuals who had become radicalised, and 
whose first and early intentions are manifested by the desire to go for training 
and/or act as an insurgent.203 A similar concept to the TROs, namely that of 
‘foreign restriction orders’, is provided for under section 58 of the Counter 
Terrorism Act 2008.204 However, these measures can only be imposed on an 
individual upon their actual conviction for a terrorism offence. TROs would 
apply in the absence of conviction for a terrorist offence, and will offer 
‘proportionate protection in relation to a demonstrable intelligence-based risk 
assessment’.205 
The outline of the proposed TROs is akin to the outline of the control order 
system. They would be issued by the Home Secretary and last for up to a year 
at a time.206 An objective test would be set out whereby the Home Secretary 
would have to be satisfied that there is reasonable suspicion of an intention to 
act and he or she would need to consider the TRO necessary to protect others 
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from the risk of terrorism.207 A limited range of restrictions would then be 
available to place upon the individual concerned.208 It would be possible for 
the TRO to prohibit travel entirely or travel to certain designated countries. As 
with control orders, a breach of a TRO would result in mandatory criminal 
prosecution209 with only limited right to appeal.210  
Whether TROs could constitute a real alternative to control orders remains to 
be seen. It seems as if the scope of restrictions available under both orders is 
identical. The current restrictions available under the control order system 
allow for a suspect to be restricted from leaving the UK, and subjected to all 
the conditions that the suggested TROs could impose.211 The suggested 
outline and application of the new TROs indicate that they are just the 
existing control order regime renamed in order to change public perception.  
The overall usefulness of TROs in curbing the threat of ‘home grown 
terrorists’ is questionable. Jihadist training manuals and detailed instructions 
for bomb making are readily available on the internet. The July 7 bombers 
actually prepared for their attacks while in the UK.212 The identification of 
possible ‘travel’ candidates before subjecting them to TROs may, however, be 
useful to intelligence agencies, as the profiling of behavioural patterns of 
terrorist suspects has helped to disrupt other terrorist cells prior to and since 
July 7.213  
The previous Labour government said that it would look into the 
recommendation of TROs further, but has highlighted similar criticisms to 
those outlined here, in its response to Lord Carlile’s proposals.214 It is 
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unknown at present how the current Tory-Liberal government will consider 
the recommendation of TROs in its review of the control order regime. 
B An Alternative Approach II: Civil Contingencies Act 
2004 
An alternative, more drastic, approach to control orders would be the 
invocation of emergency powers under Part II of the Civil Contingencies Act 
2004 (CCA).215 This would allow legislation to be passed providing for 
detention without trial in times of an acute emergency if certain conditions — 
listed in section 21 — were met. Such conditions are: that an emergency has 
occurred, is occurring or is about to occur (section 21(2)); that it is necessary 
to make provision for the purpose of preventing, controlling or mitigating an 
aspect or effect of the emergency (section 21(3); and that the need for the 
provision referred to in subsection (3) is urgent (section 21(4).216 The Act 
expressly refers to terrorism in its definition of an ‘emergency’ under section 
19(1)(c). Use of the CCA in these circumstances could be seen as a legal 
safeguard for suspects as its emergency powers are strictly limited in their 
scope and duration.217 Consequently, this could lead to improved civil 
liberties protection for individuals. The human rights pressure group Liberty 
appears to favour the CCA as the preferred basis for detention without trial 
under emergency conditions:218  
Emergency measures in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 could already be 
triggered in a genuine emergency in which the police are overwhelmed by 
multiple terror plots, allowing the government to temporarily extend pre-
charge detention subject to Parliamentary and judicial oversight. Safeguards 
offered by government today offer far less protection than that offered in the 
Civil Contingencies Act.219 
Liberty perceives the selective use of emergency powers under the CCA as a 
balance between the civil liberties of an individual and the threat that 
terrorism poses to national security.  
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This view, however, seems to overlook the considerable difficulties in directly 
applying the provisions of the CCA to individuals. The emergency powers 
provided for under the CCA are clearly designed to apply to the whole of the 
UK, or to specific regions, which are affected by a situation requiring the use 
of such powers. In Lord Carlile’s opinion, a significant problem in using the 
CCA to detain or restrict terrorist suspects, is that the Act does not allow 
emergency legislation to affect criminal proceedings.220 The Act also does not 
expressly allow for the detention of individuals,221 despite the wide scope of 
section 22(3).222 In conclusion, one can only warn against the all too eager 
application of emergency regulations in times of a continuing terrorist threat, 
which would undoubtedly affect the scope of our civil liberties in general and 
accountability for them.223   
C An Alternative Approach III: The Use of Intercept 
Evidence in Criminal Prosecution 
The Labour government stated that prosecution is always the preferred 
approach for dealing with terrorist suspects, and control orders are used only 
when prosecution or deportation is not possible.224 There is a suggestion by 
whom that the prosecution of terrorist suspects, who are otherwise subject to 
control orders, could be significantly increased if intercept evidence were 
admissible in court. Currently section 17 of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) excludes evidence in connection with any legal 
proceedings which discloses the contents of an intercepted communication or 
related communications data. This is in contrast to the position in Australia 
which has no such restrictions on the use of intercept evidence,225 providing 
that the interception has been lawfully carried out.226   
In 2008, Sir John Chilcot chaired a Privy Council review to advise the 
government on the possibility of using intercepted material as evidence in 
court.227 The review considered the benefits which would be expected to 
result from the use of intercept evidence, in addition to the risks and the 
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envisaged resource implications of any changes in the law.228 It concluded 
that a means of using intercept evidence should be introduced into UK law 
‘by developing a robust legal model based in statute and compatible with the 
ECHR’,229 provided that the use of the intercept material met certain 
operational requirements and was in toto ECHR-compatible.230 Serious doubts 
in regard to ensuring fairness in court remained231 and were confirmed in a 
recent ruling of the ECtHR in the case of Natunen v Finland.232  
However, a possible redrafting of section 17 RIPA has gained much support 
from several quarters of the government, with the Home Affairs Committee 
strongly recommending an immediate introduction of legislation allowing the 
use of intercept evidence in court.233 The Committee maintains its view 
expressed in 2007 that it is ‘ridiculous that our prosecutors are denied the use 
of ... evidence that has been proved helpful in many other jurisdictions’.234 
The former Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Sir Ken Macdonald, 
supported the opinion of the Home Affairs Committee by asserting that, if the 
UK had intercept evidence as an evidential tool, it would almost certainly 
‘mirror the experience of other jurisdictions where it is used frequently to 
great effect and results in the saving of considerable expense’.235    
Lord Carlile has, however, stated that it is unlikely that the admissibility of 
intercept evidence would have led to the prosecution of any of the controlees 
since the control orders regime was introduced in 2005.236 His statement is 
supported by a review of nine current or former control order cases, which 
concluded that intercept evidence would not have enabled a criminal 
prosecution to be brought in any of the cases studied.237 Comparisons with 
other jurisdictions were rejected as ‘ill-informed and misleading’.238 In the 
UK’s adversarial legal system the requirements for the disclosure of material 
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to the defence are far more demanding in terms of parity and equality of arms 
than in the legal system of any comparable country.239  
Due to this most recent rejection of the former government’s proposed model 
for allowing intercept evidence to be used in court, it is clear that such 
evidence will not be admissible in terrorist trials for the foreseeable future.240 
Even if intercept evidence were made available, in Lord Carlile’s opinion this 
would not have helped to prosecute any of the 12 terrorist suspects who are 
subject to control orders at the present time. This warrants the question of 
what evidence the security services and police had on the 12 individuals that 
led them to believe they were a threat to national security and UK public.  
D Possible Reforms of the Current Control Order 
System 
An important reform to the current control order system suggested by Lord 
Carlile and other commentators would be to impose a time limit of 12 months 
on control orders, without the option of renewal.241 Lord Carlile’s reasoning 
was that, after a year of an individual being subject to a control order, the 
‘immediate utility of even a dedicated terrorist attack will have seriously been 
disrupted’.242 This view was confirmed by the tribunal in the case of Secretary 
of State for the Home Department v GG,243 where it was stated that after ‘2 
years an individual subject to a control order will have lost his usefulness to 
those engaged in terrorist activities’.244  
Such a view on the ‘arbitrary end date’ for individual control orders245was not 
shared by the last government, which stressed that the PTA provided effective 
checks and balances to ensure that the opportunity to renew a control order, if 
it is necessary, is lawful.246 The government argued that setting a definite end 
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date would allow individual terrorism suspects and controlees to simply 
disengage from involvement with terrorist-related activity, knowing that they 
could re-engage after the end of that time period.247  
The impact of indefinite control orders on the lives of controlees can be quite 
significant. Without a definite time limit, individuals under a control order 
remain in a ‘state of suspended investigation’ year after year with only limited 
appeal possibilities — a situation to which criminal suspects are not 
subject.248 Presently, out of the 12 individuals subject to a control order, three 
have been subjected to the order for more than two years, with one of those 
controlees now in his fifth year.249 With control orders having no definite end 
date, an individual could be subject to one for an infinite period of time, with 
no realistic prospect of being either prosecuted or released — a truly 
Kafkaesque situation.250  
It appears that control orders at present are used to ‘plug the gap’ in cases 
where neither prosecution nor deportation would work as security measures. 
Having assessed the reforms and alternative measures proposed by various 
commentators, one must conclude that control orders are here to stay. There 
are no clear alternatives which can effectively ‘prevent’ an individual from 
participating in terrorist related activity. The previous government maintained 
that abandoning the control order system entirely would have a serious 
damaging impact on national security,251 a view shared by Lord Carlile.252 
However, it has yet to be seen whether the new Tory-Liberal government will 
adopt this view after it has undertaken a review of the control order regime — 
one of its pledges to the electorate after coming into power. 
A possible reform could be the introduction of a time limit of 12 months 
without further renewal options. This would result in greater civil liberties 
protection for the individual while helping to strike a balance between the 
liberty of an individual and the security of the nation.  
VI CONCLUSION  
Amidst the considerable controversy which has arisen since their 
implementation, control orders have now commenced their sixth year of 
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operation. The essential question to ask, however, is whether they have been 
successful in ‘preventing’ the individuals subject to them from participating in 
terrorism related activity. The government has stated in the past that the 
control order regime has successfully protected the UK from a possible 
terrorist attack by preventing the individuals successfully from participating in 
any possible terrorist related activity. But this ‘success’ came at the cost of 
possible violation of these individuals’ right to liberty, as granted under article 
5 of the ECHR.   
The UK is not alone in respect of such controversy. The Commonwealth 
jurisdictions of Canada and Australia faced massive criticism of their anti-
terrorism legislation. The constitutional validity of Australia’s control order 
regime, which has been heavily influenced by the UK precedent, has been 
challenged. In Australia, by contrast with the UK, no jurisprudence exists on 
the possible conflict between the right to liberty and the security of the nation. 
However, with Australia’s likely adoption of a federal Charter of Rights, there 
remains a remote possibility that a civil liberties challenge to the country’s 
control order regime could eventually arise. In Canada, however, cases have 
been decided concerning the country’s security certificate regime. An 
apparent shortcoming of this regime lies in Canada’s use of deportation 
measures against foreign nationals suspected of terrorism and of the 
possibility of the suspects’ torture, if they are deported.   
The present situation in the UK is that a curfew length of less than 16 hours 
will not constitute a deprivation of an individual’s liberty. Nevertheless, the 
judiciary has shown that it will not hesitate to cancel any control order, as 
evidenced in the abovementioned cases of JJ and AP, which it considers an 
interference of an individual’s article 5 rights. Currently the ECHR ruling in 
Guzzardi,253 suggests that, for control orders, the threshold for a deprivation 
of liberty within the meaning of article 5 is set at a very high level. Until a 
control order case concerning article 5 reaches the ECtHR in Strasbourg, the 
government will continue to use such orders.254  
Today, control orders may constitute the most effective means of ‘preventing’ 
individuals from participating in terrorist related activity. The alternative 
measures which have been identified by various commentators do not stand 
up to scrutiny in terms of effectiveness. However, one reform that should be 
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adopted by the government is a time limit of 12 months without a further 
renewal period. In other words, if the individual subject to a control order has 
not been prosecuted within 12 months of receiving the order, then there 
should be no option for a renewal. This would strike a fairer balance between 
an individual’s fundamental right to liberty and the right of the government to 
protect its citizens from the threat of terrorism.  
Until the terrorist threat which the UK faces diminishes, or an alternative 
method is suggested that has not already been identified — which appears 
unlikely — control orders are likely to remain. If they were abolished it would 
be necessary to release the 12 individuals subjected to control orders, a notion 
which the government will simply not accept, as it believes the 12 controlees 
to be a threat to the lives of its citizens, which it aims to protect.  
Time will tell to what extent Realpolitik will dictate the future actions of the 
present UK coalition government and to what extent the underlying conflict 
between human rights and overall state security, as exemplified in Lord 
Hoffmann’s stern warning quoted above, will be resolved.255  
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